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COMMENT
Disaggregating Legal Strategies in the War on Terror
Since the September ith attacks, Al Qaeda has pursued a global insurgency
campaign against the United States and its allies by exploiting the grievances of
local guerilla groups against their home countries. In response to this global
insurgency, many commentators have argued that a "disaggregation" strategy
is necessary to break the ties between local insurgent groups and the globalized
ideology of Al Qaeda. American counterterrorism policies have been shifting to
a disaggregation approach against this global insurgency, but our legal
strategies remain focused on tying local and regional extremist organizations to
high-level Al Qaeda leadership.
This Comment argues that current legal strategies will prove
counterproductive if they aggregate terrorist threats. The prosecution of
terrorist suspects based on the material support statute and the legal basis for
the use of military force against groups "associated" with Al Qaeda are two
such aggregating strategies. Instead, this Comment recommends adopting
disaggregation as a framework for the U.S. legal strategy against the Al Qaeda
global insurgency. A disaggregated strategy could take many forms, but this
Comment recommends that the U.S. government (1) seek to detain suspected
terrorists in the country where they are captured rather than in centralized
facilities; (2) decouple criminal terrorism prosecutions from the State
Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list; and (3) adopt a new "use of
force" statute to supplement the 20ol Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF).'
1. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C § 1541 (20o6)).
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1. DISAGGREGATED TERRORIST NETWORKS AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
Al Qaeda's operational model for the September iith attacks - train a cadre
of operatives, send them to infiltrate a Western country, and then direct them
to carry out a large-scale attack-has been replaced by a decentralized "global
insurgency" model.2 This global insurgency seeks out insurgents with
grievances against their local government and attempts to aggregate them into
a larger ideological campaign against the United States and its Western allies.'
Technological developments of the postmodern world-the low costs of
acquiring weapons and explosives, the ability of isolated aggrieved individuals
to organize via the Internet, and low organizational barriers to entry-have
enabled these small local actors to create outsized threats against hierarchically
organized states.4 The "small niche providers of violence" sometimes compete
with each other, but "at the same time they are willing to work together to
fight the United States by building a market that advances the fortunes of all."s
Al Qaeda therefore seeks to find and exploit local grievances to integrate local
groups into its broader Islamist ideology at minimal cost.
In order to fight this new globalized insurgency, many counterterrorism
experts have suggested that the United States and its allies pursue a strategy of
2. DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA 12 (2009). Kilcullen argues that Al Qaeda
uses "the same standard four tactics (provocation, intimidation, protraction, and
exhaustion) used by all insurgents in history" on a global scale against the United States and
its allies. Id.
3. See, e.g., David J. Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 597, 6oo
(2005); see also Don Rassler, Al-Qa'ida's Pakistan Strategy, CTC SENTINEL (Combating
Terrorism Ctr., West Point, N.Y.), June 2009, at 2, available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2oo/o6/Vol2Iss6-Artl.pdf ("Al-Qa'ida's conflation of the near and far
enemy target sets is an attempt to re-frame the jihad in Pakistan as one that is both local and
global.").
4. JOHN RoBB, BRAVE NEw WAR: THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF
GLOBALIZATION 74-75 (2007).
5. Id. at 74; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 65-66 (2008) (comparing Al Qaeda
to a venture capital firm that provides funding, resources, and advice to local Islamist
groups).
6. See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETwORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 44-5O (2008) (describing a bottom-up model of terrorism and the success of "Al
Qaeda Central" in exploiting local grievances). But cf Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of
Grassroots Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2008, at 133, 138 (arguing that Al Qaeda's top
leaders remain the most dangerous threat to U.S. interests).
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"disaggregation."7  If Al Qaeda's strategy succeeds by aggregating local
insurgents into a global movement, the United States should attempt to break
down the ties between local guerillas and global players like Al Qaeda.
Disaggregation results in "a series of disparate local conflicts that can be
addressed at the regional or national level without interference from global
enemies."' The concept of a "Global War on Terror" may have been useful
after the September ith attacks, but as a counterinsurgency strategy today, it is
ineffective. Lumping together groups that practice terrorism is not only
unhelpful, but actively plays into the hands of Al Qaeda as it attempts to unify
local groups under a global insurgency campaign. Disaggregation, on the other
hand, requires America to "separate [adversaries] from each other, turn them
where possible against each other, and deal with those who need to be dealt
with in sequence rather than simultaneously."' Disaggregation was a key
element of the successful U.S. "surge" in Iraq in 2oo6-2oo7o and has become
an increasingly important part of U.S. counterterrorism policy."
II. CURRENT LEGAL TACTICS CREATING AGGREGATION
A successful counterinsurgency strategy against Al Qaeda must also
encompass legal tactics. A number of factors - the desire of prosecutors to
charge as many terrorism suspects as possible, the political popularity of
aggressive military targeting, and the need to classify the fight against Al
Qaeda as a non-international armed conflict" among them-drive American
7. See, e.g., KILCULLEN, supra note 2; Thomas Rid & Marc Hecker, The Terror Fringe, POL'Y
REv. Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/
article/5619; Matthew Kowalski, Global Insurgency or Global Confrontation? Counter-
insurgency Doctrine and the "Long' War" on Terrorism, 24 DEF. & SECURITY ANALYSIS 65, 68
(2008).
8. Kilcullen, supra note 3, at 609.
9. KILCULLEN, supra note 2, at 285.
1o. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, THE GAMBLE: GENERAL PETRAEUS AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY
ADVENTURE IN IRAQ59-72 (2d ed. 2010).
ii. See National Strategy for Counterterrorism, WHITE HOUSE 9 (June 28, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-strategy.pdf.
12. The Supreme Court already determined the conflict between the United States and Al
Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
630-31 (20o6), but under international law, a NIAC exists when there is "protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 5 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). Emphasizing the organizational ties between local insurgent
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counterterrorism legal tactics toward aggregation. In this respect, the
government's legal tactics may work at cross-purposes with larger U.S.
counterterrorism strategy.
A. Aggregation in Terrorism Prosecutions
The prosecution of terrorism suspects in civilian courts is predicated on
tying individual suspects into a larger Al Qaeda network. For instance, federal
prosecutors have filed criminal charges against Hakimullah Mehsud, one of the
leaders of the Pakistani Taliban," and against low-ranking members of the
Somali militant group Al Shabaab based on their connections to Al Qaeda.'4 In
charging Mehsud, Al Shabaab, and even domestic terrorist groups based on
their ties to Al Qaeda, prosecutors may have inadvertently played into Al
Qaeda's hands by explicitly aggregating these local groups' grievances with the
larger global insurgency. On the other hand, prosecutions like the recent
indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a member of Al Shabaab who
served as a liaison between the Somali group and Al Qaeda of the Arabian
Peninsula, help disrupt the ties between local and global organizations."
In part, criminal prosecutors' reliance on connecting individual suspects
with membership in a larger terrorist organization is based on their experience
combating organized crime. Among its many provisions, the USA PATRIOT
Act of 20ol amended the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act of 1970 to include terrorism in its definition of "racketeering
groups and Al Qaeda thus strengthens the U.S. argument that a NIAC exists, thereby
allowing the United States to use military force against terrorist groups. Cf Joint Defense
Motion To Dismiss at 2, United States v. Mohammad (Military Comm'n Guantanamo Bay
Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/D-o61%2oDefense%2oMTD
%2ofor%2oLack%200f/2oJurisdiction%20%028absence%200f/2oarmed%20conflict%29 .pdf
(arguing that the military commission lacks jurisdiction to try Mohammad because the
alleged offenses did not take place within an armed conflict).
13. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Mehsud, No. 1:10-mj-oo457-RCL (D.D.C. Aug. 20,
2010), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case-docs/1369.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Mostafa, No. og-CR-3726 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009),
available at http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2olo/o8/mostafa-indict.pdf; Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Hammami, No. 07-00384 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2009), available
at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/US/Hammamlndictment.pdf; Indictment,
United States v. Ali, No. CR 10-187 PJS/FLN (D. Minn. July 19, 2009), available at
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case-docs/1355.pdf Each indictment
charges U.S. citizens with providing material support to the Somali Al Shabaab group.
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activity.'" 6 Under RICO, an individual can be convicted for mere membership
in an organization that commits two or more predicate criminal acts, which, in
addition to terrorism, include money laundering, illegal firearms possession,
and other crimes. The RICO Act makes the prosecution of suspected terrorists
significantly easier by creating culpability for low-level individuals, but it also
forces the government to connect local insurgents with the global Al Qaeda
organization, subtly aggregating the two.
Furthermore, the RICO model of prosecution may not be as effective
against "open source jihad" terrorists as it is against organized crime.
Traditionally, prosecutors indict low-level members of criminal organizations
not because foot soldiers are important-on the contrary, they generally have
few specialized skills and are easy to replace-but because they can turn state's
evidence against the organization's higher-ups." RICO prosecution, however,
assumes a hierarchical organization in which underlings receive orders from
their superiors. But Al Qaeda now relies on decentralized networks of
operatives who may not be aware of each other or the organization's
leadership' and are thus not capable of aiding future prosecutions.
The material support to terrorism statute, which criminalizes knowingly
providing material support or resources to any organization designated as a
"terrorist organization,"" has been federal prosecutors' other chief tool against
terrorism suspects since 2001.20 Providing material support to terrorists has
been prohibited since 1994," but prosecutors have increasingly turned to the
material support statute since the September 1ith attacks,22 and in 2001 and
16. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 813, 115 Stat.
272, 382 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(G) (2oo6)).
17. See, e.g., HOwARD BLUM, GANGLAND: HOW THE FBI BROKE THE MOB (1993) (describing
how the FBI was able to arrest famous mafia boss John Gotti when one of his underbosses
turned state's evidence against him).
is. See, e.g., Statement for the Record, S. Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm., Nine Years After
9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of
Michael Leiter, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr.) (noting that groups plotting against the
U.S. "may not receive training, direction, or support from al-Qa'ida senior leaders").
19. 18 U.S.C. § 23 39A-B (2006).
20. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19-20 (2005).
21. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005,
1o8 Stat. 1796, 2022 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (20o6)).
22. The material support statute was used only six times prior to 2001, but ninety-two times
between 2002 and 2005. Chesney, supra note 20, at 19-20.
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2004, Congress made the statute extraterritorial in reach.23 Furthermore, since
material support is itself a substantive crime, individuals can also be charged
with conspiracy to provide material support, extending criminal liability to
virtually any member of a foreign terrorist organization.'
In June 2010, the Supreme Court rejected a legal challenge to the statute in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, finding that the law did not violate the
First Amendment when it restricted individuals' ability to support the lawful,
nonviolent activities of designated foreign terrorist organizations - even those
without a connection to Al Qaeda, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party or the
Tamil Tigers." As a result, it is difficult to imagine any activity a member of a
foreign terrorist organization could engage in that would not violate the
material support statute.26
As a practical matter, the material support statute also shares the RICO
Act's aggregation flaw. Many of the local insurgent groups that Al Qaeda aims
to aggregate into its global insurgency-including those without a history of
attacking U.S. interests, like Balochi resistance groups in Pakistan and Iran-
are included on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations. 7
Any form of support given to these organizations, even by non-U.S. citizens
outside of the country, thus violates the statute. An Al Qaeda financier
captured in Brooldyn can be charged, and possibly sentenced, identically to a
man who sends funds to an organization attempting to establish an
independent Silh state in India." When used against members of regional or
23. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 8o 5 (a)(1)(A), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (20o6)) (making "material support" for terrorist acts an extraterritorial
crime); Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 6602, 118 Stat. 3761, 3761-62 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 5 233 9 D (2006)).
24. Under the common law of conspiracy, conspirators can be found guilty even if they do not
know the identities of their coconspirators. See United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129 (7 th
Cit. 1995), affd 124 F.3d 206 (7 th Cit. 1997).
25. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
26. See id. at 2725 ("Congress considered and rejected the view that ostensibly peaceful aid
would have no harmful effects.").
27. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123o85.htm (last visited May 19, 2011).
28. Compare Superseding Indictment, United States v. El-Hanafi, No. S4 10 Cr. 162 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://jnslp.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/el-hanafi-and
-hasanoff-s4-indictment.pdf (charging a U.S. citizen with providing and conspiring to
provide material support to Al Qaeda), with United States v. Awan, No. CR-o6-o54, 2007
WATL 2071748 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2007) (sentencing a Canadian citizen to fourteen years in
prison for sending money to the Khalistan Commando Force).
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local insurgencies, the material support statute conflates membership in any
foreign terrorist organization with complicity in Al Qaeda's goals.
B. Aggregation in Legal Authorizations for Military Force
Not only does the law enforcement approach to counterterrorism rely on an
aggregation framework, but so too does the military legal model for fighting
terrorism. The U.S. government's targeted killing and detention policies for
suspected terrorists rely on the legal authority granted by the 20ol AUMF,
which was explicitly tied to "nations, organizations, or persons" involved in the
September iith attacks.2 ' The President has the power to use military force
outside of congressional authorization,30 but the Obama Administration is
relying on the AUMF alone as authorization for strikes against suspected
terrorists in Pakistan."
As with criminal prosecutions, military actions have not been limited to Al
Qaeda members. Rather, Predator drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan
have targeted members of the Pakistani Taliban (including Hakimullah
Mehsud)," the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," the East Turkistan Islamic
Movement," the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group," and Afghan warlords
who, while formally unaffiliated with the Taliban or Al Qaeda, oppose the
29. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C § 1541 (20o6)).
3o. See, e.g., Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Auth. To Use Military Force in Libya 6 (Apr. 1,
2011) [hereinafter Krass Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
201/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf ("'[T]he President has the power to commit
United States troops abroad,' as well as to 'take military action,' 'for the purpose of
protecting important national interests,' even without specific prior authorization from
Congress." (quoting Auth. To Use U.S. Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 6
(1992))).
31. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/
13 9i19.htm.
32. Zahid Hussain, Pakistan Believes Taliban Chief Is Dead, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBloool424o5274873455804575o57141141688332.html.
33. Ben Arnoldy, Pakistan Army Against Taliban: What Are the Waziristan Goals?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/
1027 /po6soi-wosc.html.
34. Bill Roggio, US Airstrike Killed 15 Turkistan Islamic Party Fighters in Afghanistan, LONG WARJ.,
Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2o1o/oi/usairstrike_ killed i.php.
3s. Bill Roggio, Wanted Abu Sayyaf Operative Reported Killed in North Waziristan, LONG WAR J.,
Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/oi/wanted-abu-sayyaf op.php.
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Karzai government."6 Many of these groups would qualify as "cobelligerents"
of Al Qaeda,17 in that they have planned or carried out attacks against American
targets, but their ambitions are local or regional rather than global.
The Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, is perhaps the best example of a group
formed to oppose a local government, but then aggregated by the United
States into the Global War on Terror. The TTP was formed in 2007 with the
goal of overthrowing the Pakistani government" and did not carry out an
attack against an American target until December 20o9' when it sent a suicide
bomber to attack a U.S. base in Afghanistan.4 o American drone strikes,
however, targeted the TTP's leader, Baitullah Mehsud, as early as June 20o8.*'
Of course, American intelligence officials may have possessed classified
information about the TTP's intentions well in advance of the December 2009
attack, but a successful disaggregation strategy would suggest attempting to
separate local insurgents from Al Qaeda before using force.
In order to target local insurgents under the auspices of the AUMF, the
U.S. government must adopt an expansive reading of the AUMF that considers
any Islamist insurgent group to be as dangerous as Al Qaeda." In litigation
surrounding the Uighur detainees at Guantinamo Bay, for instance, the
government argued that the East Turkistan Islamic Movement-a group
36. See Walter Pincus & Thomas E. Ricks, CIA Fails in Bid To Kill Afghan Rebel with a Missile,
WASH. POST, May 1o, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62842
-2002May9.html (describing a U.S. predator drone strike against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
leader of the Hezb-e Islami group). Hekmatyar has been involved in U.S.-backed peace
negotiations with the Mghan government. See Carlotta Gall, Insurgent Faction Presents
Afghan Peace Plan, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/201o/03/24/world/
asia/24afghan.html.
37. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2110 (2005) ("[A] terrorist organization that joins al
Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11, can be viewed as part
of the 'organization' against which Congress authorized force.").
38. See Greg Bruno & Jayshree Bajoria, Interview with Brian Fishman: Jihadists and Times Square,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 6, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/jihadists
-times-square/p22058.
39. See M. Ilyas Khan, "CIA Bomber" Video Indicates Taliban's Reach, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/84501o2.stm.
40. See Jane Perlez & Pir Zubair Shah, Pakistani Taliban Leader Is Reported Dead, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 20o, http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o2/o/world/asia/olpstan.htm.
41. See 20o8: The Year of the Drone, NEW AM. FOUND., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.nev
drones/2008 (last visited June 18, 2011).





DISAGGREGATING LEGAL STRATEGIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
dedicated to fighting for Uighur self-determination in China -was "effectively
'part of the same organization"'" as Al Qaeda, so it could "'fit them in the
AUMF."' In other words, the current legal basis for the U.S. uses of force
frequently causes the government to aggregate local insurgents with global
players, despite counterinsurgency strategy's recommendation to the contrary.
III. MOVING TO A DISAGGREGATED LEGAL STRATEGY
Previous academic works have applied the principles of counterinsurgency
to the laws of war45 and recognized that disaggregation can play a role in
determining when conflicts with terrorists end.** But scholars have not yet
built a legal strategy for pursuing the disaggregation of local insurgents. If, as
counterinsurgency theory suggests, defeating Al Qaeda requires separating
local grievances from global ideology," our legal strategies should treat Al
Qaeda and other organizations with global goals differently from local
insurgents with limited goals. A disaggregated legal strategy would require
rethinking the ways the United States fights terrorism. To illustrate what form
this strategy might take, this Comment proposes three specific policy changes
to move the United States closer to a disaggregated legal strategy.
First, whenever possible, the United States should detain suspected
terrorists in the state where they are captured, rather than at one central facility
like Guantinamo Bay or the Parwan Detention Facility. There will inevitably
be some terrorists-for instance, those from Yemen or other unstable
countries -who for security reasons cannot be held where they are captured.48
In these instances, it might be worth the risk of aggregating terrorist threats in
43. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3 d 834, 844 (D.C. Cir. 20o8) (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 844 n-4 (citation omitted). The Obama Administration claims the ability to detain
persons who are part of forces "associated" with Al Qaeda, but it has explicitly avoided
defining the "precise characteristics of 'associated forces"' sufficient to authorize detention.
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No.
08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
4s. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95
VA. L. REV. 1745 (2009); Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the
Laws of War, 2o DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 429 (2010).
46. See Adam Klein, Note, The End ofAl Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror,
110 COLuM. L. REV. 1865, 1897 (2010).
47. See Kilcullen, supra note 3, at 609.
48. See, e.g., William Glaberson & Robert F. Worth, Yemen Dispute Slows Closing of Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.con/2oo9/o4/24/world/middleeast/
24yemen.html.
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order to reduce the chances of dangerous terrorists escaping from custody.
Nevertheless, since "efforts to kill or capture insurgent leaders" can "generat[e]
grievances and caus[e] disparate groups to coalesce,"49 the capture and
detention of insurgent leaders should be viewed as an event that has the
potential to transfer local grievances across geographic boundaries. By contrast,
detaining and prosecuting insurgents in the territory where they are captured,
and in dispersed, smaller prisons, means local insurgents will find it more
difficult to connect their causes to a global insurgency."o Detaining suspected
terrorists in their home countries would also allow the government to avoid the
question of whether habeas corpus rights extend to U.S. detention centers
outside of American borders."
A disaggregated legal approach also suggests revising the legal framework
for domestic prosecution of suspected terrorists. Although the RICO Act and
material support statute provide prosecutors the wide-ranging authority that
they need to halt incipient plots, their broad sweep can also cause them to
conflate support for local groups with participation in a global insurgency. This
problem could potentially be avoided by decoupling the State Department's
foreign terrorist organization designations -a list often drafted to advance U.S.
relations with states facing local insurgencies 2 - from domestic criminal
prosecutions.
As the law currently stands, providing material support for any designated
foreign terrorist organization is a crime, no matter how likely the group is to
launch an attack on U.S. interests.53 Aggressive prosecution of those who send
money or materiel to Al Qaeda is essential, but law enforcement officials
should not treat groups that are unaffiliated with Al Qaeda identically to those
that are. Instead of relying on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist
49. DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 221 (2010).
So. See Sitaraman, supra note 45, at 1818 ("Detaining and prosecuting insurgents in the territory
in which they were captured decentralizes the grievances . . . and limits their ability to link
to the global insurgency."); cf Katherine Seifert, Can fihadis Be Rehabilitated?, MIDDLE EQ.,
Spring 2010, at 21 (describing efforts to deradicalize terrorists in centralized prison
facilities).
51. The D.C. Circuit has found that habeas rights do not extend to detainees held at the Parwan
Detention Facility in Afghanistan, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 6oS F-3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), but
the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question.
52. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) ("A number of
designated foreign terrorist organizations have attacked moderate governments with which
the United States has vigorously endeavored to maintain close and friendly relations."
(quoting Joint Appendix at 137 [ 16, Holder (Nos. 08-1498 & 09-89) (affidavit of Kenneth
R. McCune, Assoc. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State))).
53. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, supra note 27.
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Organization list, the material support statute could criminalize support only
for organizations that could be targeted with military force. Whether under the
AUMF or the new use of force statute proposed below, that definition would
include Al Qaeda and its "associated forces,"54 but not groups with grievances
only against their local governments.
Lastly, disaggregation implies that the AUMF may be a clumsy legal tool in
authorizing military force against terrorist organizations. Although the open-
ended AUMF does not contain any time limits on the use of force,ss requiring
U.S. forces to justify strikes on the basis of the target's connection to the
September iith attacks or cobelligerency with Al Qaeda risks being
simultaneously too narrow and too broad for an effective counterinsurgency
strategy. The AUMF may be too narrow because all but the most expansive
readings of the statute's text do not grant authority to use force against local
insurgents who have not linked themselves to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, yet too
broad because once a local group is targeted, it becomes legally
indistinguishable from Al Qaeda.
Rather than continuing to rely on the AUMF, the Obama Administration
could ask for new legislation from Congress to authorize the use of force
against any terrorist entities that attack or threaten U.S. security interests.s"
Great care would be required in drafting a new statute, but eliminating the
AUMF's nexus to the September ith attacks would give the executive the
flexibility to use force against threats that could not have been foreseen a
decade ago." At the same time, insisting that the targeted groups pose a threat
s4. This change would require a clear definition of "associated forces," a term that both the
courts and the Obama Administration have avoided defining. See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama,
61o F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[I]t is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria
for determining whether an individual is 'part of al Qaeda. That determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach . . . .");
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No.
o8-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (avoiding, in the brief filed by the government, any
definition of the characteristics of "associated forces"); cf Khan v. Obama, No. 10-53o6, 2011
WL 3890843, at *11-12 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2011) (affirming the district court's finding that
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin was an associated force of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2002).
ss. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. 5 1541 (20o6)). But cf Bruce Ackerman & Oona A. Hathaway, What
Will Congress Do About Afghanistan?, SLATE, Dec. 9, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2237884
(arguing that Congress should adopt a new use of force statute for the Afghan war with
explicit time limits).
56. See Bellinger, supra note 42.
57. Even if a new use of force statute were enacted, the President would still retain his Article II
powers to use force. See, e.g., Krass Memorandum, supra note 30. But, in the detention
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to U.S. security-perhaps by requiring the executive branch to make formal
findings to Congress-would reduce the chance that America unwittingly
aggregates local guerillas with Al Qaeda's global insurgency. The proposed
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 contains one such
possible refashioning of the authorization for use of force.'" Section 1034 of the
Authorization Act, which passed the House on May 26, 2011, affirms that "the
President has the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force during
the current armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces"
pursuant to the AUMF, and further specifies that
(3) the current armed conflict includes nations, organizations, and
persons who -
(A) are part of, or are substantially supporting, al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners; or
(B) have engaged in hostilities or have directly supported hostilities
in aid of a nation, organization, or person described in
subparagraph (A) . ... s
The Obama Administration has stated that it "strongly objects" to section 1034
because it "would effectively recharacterize [the conflict's] scope and would
risk creating confusion regarding applicable standards,"so going so far as to
declare that "if the final bill presented to the President includes these
provisions . . . the President's senior advisors would recommend a veto."6
Although the Obama Administration may be correct that section 1034
would recharacterize the scope of the War on Terror, that recharacterization
would be a helpful move toward disaggregation. Not only would section 1034
decouple uses of force from the September 1ith attacks, but it would also
require that targeted groups be "substantially supporting" Al Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces.6' This proposed language would permit U.S.
context at least, the Obama Administration has declined to rely on inherent Article II
authority, making a new statute desirable. See Koh, supra note 31.
s8. See H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, May 26, 2011).
59. Id. § 1034(3)-
6o. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 154o-National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012,
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 1-2, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr154or_2onlo524.pdf.
61. Id. at 3. The Administration's veto threat was also prompted by other provisions of the bill,
including those regarding prosecutions of detainees. It is therefore less clear whether section
1034 alone would prompt a presidential veto.
62. H.R. 1540 5 1034(3).
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targeting of groups that are directly tied to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but only
associated forces that are "engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners." 63 Section 1034 thus distinguishes between groups like the
Haqqani Network that have already joined Al Qaeda to fight against the
United States and groups that are sympathetic to Al Qaeda but have not yet
engaged in hostilities. Section 1034 explicitly authorizes the use of force against
the former but implicitly disallows it against the latter.
On the other hand, the inclusion of "coalition partners" in section 1034 is
potentially problematic for a disaggregation theory unless the executive branch
construes the definition of "coalition partner" narrowly. Insurgent groups that
target only local governments would be engaged in hostilities against "coalition
partners," and therefore no different from groups targeting the United States
directly. For example, section 1034 would have authorized military force
against a group like the Pakistani Taliban, which was not directly engaged
against the United States, but was fighting Pakistan, a coalition partner.64
Unless the executive branch defines "coalition partner" narrowly to include
only countries whose interests are aligned directly with the United States, such
as fellow members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, section 1034 risks aggregating local insurgents with global
threats.
CONCLUSION
Al Qaeda's global insurgency not only requires different counterterrorism
policies, but also a different legal framework. The wide-ranging authority and
discretion granted to prosecutors through the RICO Act and the material
support to terrorism statutes, and to the military through the AUMF, risk
inadvertently furthering Al Qaeda's goals by aggregating local guerilla groups
with a global insurgency. Counterintuitively, legal policies that are effective in
securing convictions and targeting suspected terrorists may not promote
America's long-term interests. An additional difficulty is that the rhetoric of
aggregation is politically favorable for both U.S. elected officials, given the
ongoing political salience of September iith, and for Al Qaeda and local
63. Id.; see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41920,
DETAINEE PROVISIONS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILLS 13 (2011), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41920.pdf ("[T]he requirement that those entities
described in subparagraph 3(B) [of section 1034] engage in or support hostilities seems to
require a nexus to armed hostilities, rather than mere support to an entity described in
subparagraph 3(A).").
64. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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insurgents, who can raise their respective profiles by associating together.
Nevertheless, U.S. legal strategies should attempt to separate local insurgents
by treating them differently from global players like Al Qaeda. Doing so
requires revisiting our detention policies, our domestic criminal laws, and the
legal justification for the U.S. military's use of force overseas.
MICHAEL J. ELLIS
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